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From 1982 to 1987, the word "corruption" was used by The Economist and The
Financial Times an average 229 times a year: a notable but modest usage that was not
comparable to words such as "inflation," "unemployment" or "budget deficit." Between
1989 and 1992, the frequency of "corruption" doubled, reaching an annual average of 502
times. This period saw the start of Operation Clean Hands in Italy and a series of political
fund-raising scandals in Spain and France. In the next three years, from 1993 to 1995,
Europe's top two financial periodicals used the word "corruption" 1,076, 1,099 and 1,246
times respectively.
The map of corruption scandals has likewise broadened: if in the late 80s
corruption was associated foremost with Latin America, Southern Europe and Africa, in
the past few years Russia and the other countries in transition have become the main
source of corruption scandals.
The last decade has also changed the electoral price of political corruption. If the
70s were the decade of Bettino Craxi and the other "smart guys," in the past three years
alone allegations of corruption have toppled the left-wing governments in Bulgaria and
Hungary, and the right-wing cabinet in the Czech Republic - to take but Eastern Europe.
If today very different countries and societies such as Nigeria, the US, Mexico, China,
Bulgaria, Russia and Belgium have anything at all in common, that is the perception of
corruption.
Corruption is an issue that has transcended the borders of nation-states and
largely determines decision-making on global financial crisis management. The OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions and the IMF and World Bank decision against lending to provenly corrupt
governments are indicative of a dramatic change in the international financial
community's attitude to corruption and crooked governance. The media and pressure
groups such as Transparency International have turned the heat up on governments and
parliaments to launch a crusade against corruption. If until yesterday many people saw
corruption as an inevitable evil, today corruption has become an intolerable evil.
In the context of this international anticorruption campaign, to argue that the
Bulgarian government would be wrong to give priority to the combat of corruption would
sound odd, to say the least. Yet this is at face value only. "Identifying" corruption as a
crucial issue in Bulgaria's development should not make this nation blind to the risks of
anticorruption policies and anticorruption rhetoric. My general contention is that under
the present circumstances, the price of the anticorruption policy advocated by "new
moralists" would prove as high as the economic and political price of corruption itself. I
believe that in the course of transition the only feasible anticorruption strategy is reform
of the state, and that substituting this goal by any special anticorruption measures is
strategically unjustified. The consensus that corruption must be contained should not
make the public oblivious to the fact that there are different strategies of doing this.
Corruption is not a disease - it is a symptom. The fact that most Bulgarians see
transition as a period of "shadow rule" is indicative not of any inherent relation between
democracy and corruption or of any cultural specificity of the Bulgarian nation, but of an
overall crisis in the interaction between state and society, between state and market. This
crisis is encoded in the general development of the Bulgarian economy in the past one
hundred years and testifies to the tragic blame of Bulgarian capitalism.
The present prevalent sense of pervasive corruption may also be traced back to
recent developments. The last ten years have brought radical changes which have
intensified the sense of rampant corruption.
Privatization and shock social stratification have created an environment in
which corruption in one form or another has become a main source of wealth and new
social status. Reallocation of so much national wealth so fast is arguably unprecedented
in Bulgarian history.
The impotence of the postcommunist state has created conditions in which
organized crime has "privatized" the role of the state as a source of violence, with various
shady conglomerates forcing private business to pay "protection money."
Certain private economic interests have usurped the right of the legitimate public
institutions to manage the national resources.
A general sense of insecurity and incompetence of public administration have
consolidated the corruption promiscuity of the existing system. In this sense, the greatest
victory scored by the government in the fight against corruption to date is the renewed
sense of prospects and stability. When the future seems doubtful or even outright
dangerous, corruption becomes an option for many public officials.
Monetarization of the classical, pre-transition corruption is the other major
factor breeding a sense of total moral disintegration. In the years of communist rule, years
dominated by the economy of shortages, corruption normally came in the form of
"bartering." In most cases, it took the form of exchange of influence and services;
straightforward bribery was the exception rather than the rule. The monetarization of
corruption as a business transaction between buyers and sellers have made it more visible
and obnoxious for the majority of the population. Nepotism and clientage are no longer a
good enough excuse.
All those factors suggest why the overwhelming majority believe that corruption
in Bulgaria today is higher than in the 70s or 80s.
Yet none of those factors are a sound argument for the need of a special policy
against corruption. The fact that people see the present situation as corrupt chaos does not
mean that combating corruption should replace reforms on the public agenda. The real
question with which Bulgarian society is confronted is whether the government will be
guided by the logic of the fight against corruption or by the logic of reforms.
In this sense, the drive against corruption is very much like the drive against
unemployment. Unless the economy is placed on a normal basis and there is real growth,
any superficial attempt to create jobs will not only fail to improve, but will actually
worsen the general economic situation.
I will try to prove my thesis that special anticorruption laws and special
anticorruption policies other than the policy of state and economic liberalization would
actually do more harm than good, by citing four arguments.
My first argument is that corruption cannot be measured and in this sense the
success of anticorruption measures cannot be judged objectively. Hence the combat of
corruption inevitably becomes a PR exercise.
My second argument is that all measures that could have a short-term
psychological effect, reassuring people that the government is indeed determined to fight
corruption, will, in the long term, make public administration even less effective, keeping
the environment highly corruptible.
My third argument is that Bulgaria's political history in the past one hundred
years provides ample evidence that all attempts to pursue anticorruption policies have
invariably led to more state regulation and were essentially anti-market and anti-liberal.
My fourth argument is that in the conditions of political polarization and given the high
public sense of insecurity, the policy of "combating corruption" and the respective
anticorruption rhetoric will facilitate a populist turn of the tide and destabilize democratic
institutions.
Argument One
Contrary to crime, corruption cannot be measured. We can never check
empirically whether corruption under the right-wing Stefan Stambolov government
(1887-1894) was higher than that under Socialist Zhan Videnov (1994-1997). There are
several reasons why corruption is impossible to measure, and they are of crucial relevance
to the choice of anticorruption strategies.
The definition of corruption itself is very dynamic, and we have seen the domain
of corruption growing steadily after every big scandal. That is why we cannot measure
corruption in terms of history, for what constitutes corruption today was not necessarily
seen as such yesterday.
The second reason why we cannot measure corruption is that unlike normal
crime, there are no "victims" of corruption and there is no one to report the crime. In the
case of corruption, both the bribe giver and the bribe taker are interested in keeping their
deal secret. What the public usually get to hear about are foiled corrupt deals.
The only way we could measure corruption is if we stuck to the confirmed cases
of corruption, but that would place us in the absurd situation of claiming that there were
20 to 30 cases of corruption in Bulgaria a year - which would make the whole
anticorruption campaign ridiculous.
Since it is impossible to have objective data on the decline or rise of corruption,
it is impossible to judge the efficiency of anticorruption measures. This practically means
that the effect of those measures cannot be gauged. What is possible to measure and is
measured by organizations such as Transparency International and Political Risk
Consultancy, is the general public's perception of the level of corruption in their country.
Yet corruption and perception of corruption are not one and the same thing. People are all
too often inclined to see various forms of administrative incompetence that are not
associated with personal benefit as cases of corruption, or to use "corruption" as a buzz
word for any social environment in which there are no clear rules of the game or those
rules are ignored. In this sense, we should keep in mind that in politics perception is
reality, just as we should keep in mind that in perception reality is politics.
Argument Two
My second argument is that the measures which the public expects the
government to take against corruption, the measures that could change public perceptions,
are measures that do not really curb corruption and pro-corruption factors.
In a representative national poll conducted in Bulgaria by the Center for the
Study of Democracy and Vitosha Research in June 1998, 34.4% of the respondents said
that tightening institutional controls was the most effective remedy for corruption, 20.7%
recommended raising the wages of civil servants, and just 5% saw the solution in greater
openness and transparency of government.
My thesis is that attempts at tightening institutional controls and wage raises
cannot be effective instruments of containing corruption in Bulgaria at the present stage.
Passage of anticorruption laws and imposing heavier punishment on corrupt officials
cannot work in the present environment for, as Gary Baker points out in his revolutionary
study [ARTICLE???] "Crime and Punishment," the deterrent power of punishment results
from the size of the punishment and the probability of its being imposed. In Bulgaria's
case, the deterrent power of punishment tends to be nil, for no matter how much the
prison term for corruption might be extended, considering the current state of the
administration of justice in Bulgaria the probability of actually sentencing a corrupt
official likewise tends to be nil.
Founding a special anticorruption agency to "blow the whistle" on corrupt
officials in the administration or particular institutions seems just as ineffective. First, that
means more public spending and more administration and, second, such an agency cannot
replace the ineffective judiciary. In all likelihood, the establishment of such an agency
will not curb corruption, but will ultimately increase the number of actors along the
corruption chain, which means that more public assets will eventually be "pocketed."
In their book The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity, Frank Anechiario [IMETO TOUK I V
REFERENCES E SPELVANO RAZLICHNO - KATERINA] and James Jacobs contend
that the hundred-year-long anticorruption efforts of the authorities in New York City
show that anticorruption projects are very cost-intensive, cripple the local administration
and do not produce any mentionable improvements in red tape.
Nor are pay hikes, the public's second favourite anticorruption measure, likely to
contain corruption in Bulgaria.
Several World Bank surveys have proven unambiguously that not just any, but
only a high enough wage raise of civil servants could be an effective anticorruption
measure. Most surveys cite Singapore as a success story in this respect. Notably,
however, Singapore's government ministers are among the best paid in the world, and if
Bulgaria were to decide to apply that standard the country would go bankrupt in a single
month. Given Bulgaria's current financial situation and the presence of a Currency Board,
raising the wages of public officials to levels that could indeed contain corruption is
simply impossible. Furthermore, an inconsiderable pay raise would only raise the size of
bribes, since a public official's pay is directly proportionate to his or her "kickback."
Show trials and the pillorying of a handful of bigwigs - the other measure that
might have a psychological effect on the public - entail the risk that the pilloried bigwigs
would come mainly from the opposition and that the fight against corruption could be
used as an excuse for private and partisan vendetta. Recent political developments in
Malaysia suggest that when they start slipping in the polls, any government will suddenly
recall that their rivals were corrupt.
Argument Three
My third argument is that Bulgaria's own political history shows that liberal
reform and anticorruption policies are not necessarily allies in the effort to change
society.
The ideology and practice of the Zveno political circle (a small political
organization that established a dictatorial regime in Bulgaria in 1934 and 1935) are a case
study of the attempt to pursue an anticorruption policy in Bulgaria. Against the
background of widespread public disgust and disillusionment with the then political
status quo and in an environment described by the period press as "totally corrupt," Zveno
implemented their political project which was based on total state interference in public
and political life, outlawing of all political parties and suspension or abridgement of
constitutional freedoms. The case of Zveno shows that unlike the Anglo-Saxon tradition
where public anticorruption sentiments target foremost big government and excessive
administration, in the Bulgarian tradition corruption is fought by more state regulation
and more administration. The anticorruption rhetoric in Bulgaria has always been anti-
market and, in many cases, anti-liberal. We only have to listen to some of the harshest
critics of corruption in the course of privatization in Bulgaria today, and we will realize
that their alternative is not cleaner privatization but less privatization.
The political practices of communist rule in the 80s are the other case study of
the administrative essence of anticorruption projects in Bulgaria. We only have to recall
Andropov's attempt to replace the command economy by get-tough policies and we will
realize why the government should not give special priority to the combat of corruption.
Argument Four
My fourth argument is theoretical-practical. Politics in countries such as Belarus,
Slovakia (under Meciar), Yugoslavia and Russia is an eloquent example of how anti-
reformist political parties and leaders tend to adopt the fight against corruption as their
main platform. Incapable of providing alternatives to the policy of liberalization, those
leaders will replace the battle of ideas by accusations of corruption and anticorruption
incantations. Unfortunately, this does not mean that the reformers are cleaner than their
opponents by definition. As Daniel Kaufman's empirical study shows, corruption has no
ideological hue and comes across the ideological spectrum. The findings of this survey
show all too well that public opinion does not regard right-wing governments as less
corrupt than their left-wing counterparts. An unfortunate conclusion, considering that
only a few years ago the idea that rightists were ousted from power because of
unemployment, and leftists, because of corruption, was regarded as a textbook truth.
These four arguments substantiate my thesis that if the Bulgarian government
really wants to curb corruption, it should not "fight" corruption but proceed with
reforming the state by deregulation, demonopolization, simpler tax laws and higher
competition. Precisely this type of reforms will eventually eliminate the legislative and
administrative environment in which postcommunist corruption thrives. The best policy
of customs controls is not investing in sophisticated control systems but investing in new
border crossings.
Conclusion
If my reasoning that the government should not "fight" corruption if it wants to
contain corruption is correct, does this mean that the ongoing anticorruption campaign -
in which the US Administration, the European Union and the World Bank have been
pumping millions of dollars - in a sense does more harm than good?
My answer is negative or, rather, I would want it to me negative. The fact that
the government should not combat corruption does not mean that no one should do so.
Needless to say, neither does the fact that someone is giving money for the combat of
corruption mean that this money cannot become a source of corruption. A born sceptic, I
am somewhat suspicious of the protest enthusiasm of Transparency International and
their new crusade, yet at the same time precisely Transparency International, in coalition
with some of the best IMF and World Bank experts, have succeeded in changing our
perceptions of the economic price of corruption and have armed us with an awareness
that empowers civil society to control the level of government corruption. The most
interesting findings about the new anticorruption economy are formulated as follows by
the IMF's Vito Tanzi:
Other things being equal, high corruption is associated with high public investment.
Other things being equal, high corruption is associated with low government revenue.
Other things being equal, high corruption is associated with low operation and
maintenance expenditures.
Other things being equal, high corruption is associated with poor quality of
infrastructure.
Other things being equal, high corruption is associated with low foreign investments.
In sum, the most important aspect of Tannics approach to the economic effect of
corruption is that corruption changes the logic of investment decision-making. A corrupt
government will try to channel public investment in "white elephants," or large projects
with a high corruption potential. This explains why poor and corrupt countries love
building state-of-the-art airports.
The new awareness produced by the anticorruption lobby is also a new
instrument of civic control which the media, political parties and NGOs could use
effectively. The strategy which I propose is a strategy controlling the logic of government
decision, not a Utopian strategy of controlling the motives of decision-makers. This will
allow us to go beyond the limits of the legalese and moralistic view of corruption.
The strategy which I am proposing and which is based on the new empirical
anticorruption awareness is an awareness of corrupt governments, not an awareness of
corrupt government ministers. This awareness will not be enough for the courts, but will
be enough for the electorate. When we need to know if our mayor is corrupt, we do not
need a government commission to tell us whether they are or aren't. The anticorruption
surveys suggest that when the major of a city is spending millions of dollars on the
construction of a new stadium while the city's infrastructure is falling apart, then the
chance that they or their team are corrupt is high enough to warrant criminal prosecution.
Argentina's President Carlos Menem once said that corruption was like inflation
- we could not hope that it would disappear, and that the important thing was to contain it
within reasonable limits. President Menem is right, of course, but at the same time
corruption is different from inflation since we always know the percentage of the inflation
level, but never that of the corruption level. In this sense, corruption indeed cannot
disappear - the important thing is to contain corruption within reasonable limits.
